Response
to Religious Naturalism
By
Mark Bair
Summary of Jerome Stone's Position
Is religious experience in the
same category as the exhilaration one can feel during athletic
competition? When a Christian talks about her experience with God, is she
saying something on an objectively different level than an artist who
talks about a “creative high?” Or are these just two examples of
personal and subjective experiences?
Jerome Stone raises these
questions (although in a somewhat veiled way) in his article “The
Viability of Religious Naturalism,”
in which he argues for an alternative to both theism and classical
naturalism. He defines religious
naturalism as “the attitude and belief that there are religious
aspects of the world which can be conceived within a naturalistic
framework.” These “religious aspects” include values
and experiences that are similar
enough to those in traditional religions that they can rightly be called
religious. We may ask, “How does this his naturalism differ from
humanistic naturalism?” Stone's answer is
that religious naturalism has an “openness to resources and
challenges beyond the humanly manageable.” These resources and
challenges do not come from a separate supernatural realm, but from within
the natural world itself--since that is all that exists according to
naturalism. Furthermore, Stone says religious naturalism is less confident
than humanism, having “a greater sense that we are not masters of our
own fate.”
How does one have a religious
experience in a naturalistic framework? According to Stone, “both creative
processes and normative demands
can be termed religious when they are relatively transcendent.” In other words, one can have a “transcendent” experience
even though it comes about immanently within the whole process of the
world, not as part of an “ontologically distinct” or “objectively
transcendent realm.” In
Christian theism, God dwells in such an “ontologically distinct
realm,” one that is often referred to as the “supernatural” or
“spiritual realm.” Some even call it the unseen part of reality. In Stone's conception, there exists no such
realm. However, we can still have religious experiences in a relative
sense. An experience is “relatively transcendent” in the sense that it
is “transcendent to the perceived
situation.” In short, such an experience is one that is beyond normal
explanation. It is not however a divine intervention in the theistic sense of a
“miracle.” The experience does not transcend the natural realm, just
the normal perceptions or normal
achievements of the natural realm.
An example of a creative
process which is superior to
a situation as perceived would be an unexpected healing. Rather than call
it a “miracle,” religious naturalism explains it in terms of the
“situationally transcendent force,” which could be the physician,
medicine, recuperative power of the body, or an interaction of them. The
healing is a transcendent experience because it is beyond normal
experience and perception. We may later be able to explain it if we gain
more scientific knowledge.
Typical of normative
demands which are continually transcendent to our present behavior would
be values like justice, beauty, and moral goodness. We never arrive at
these in a perfect sense, therefore they are transcendent, and always will
to some degree transcend our present behavior.
Stone prefers the term “the
divine” to “God.” The
divine is a symbol for values, processes and experiences that are
relatively transcendent. At the heart of Stone's point of view is the
pragmatic difficulties of theism and the corresponding pragmatic benefits
of religious naturalism.
The Philosophical Issues Involved
First of all, is Stone's
proposed category of religious naturalism logically sensible? Some might
instinctively call it an oxymoron. Religion traditionally assumes the
existence of the supernatural. Stone has redefined
and restricted “religious” to experiences and values within a
naturalist universe. In doing so, he has imported a metaphysical position against
religion by appearing to broaden
our view of religion. So, in
the context of Stone's naturalism, his use of the term “religious” is
logical, but it affirms no more than any other
naturalism. It simply allows people to embrace emotions and
experiences without having to justify them rationally.
While he may think he is proposing something different, to me it is
just a pragmatic proposal that hopes to soften the crushing blows of pure
naturalistic secularism. Another issue Stone's piece raises is, can
anything morally authoritative be said without the existence of an
ontologically distinct realm or being? To put another way, is objective
supernatural religion essential to morality and values? Thirdly, how does
one say what is “preferable” philosophically? What is “better”? In
his pragmatic argument Stone seems to assume a set of values. What is the
basis for those values?
In addition, Stone has raised a
burden of proof issue. He intimates that the burden of proof is completely
on the theist to demonstrate a distinct transcendent realm. The absence of
such a demonstration to him seems to be enough to build on the foundation
of naturalism. His thinking is based on what I think are two weak
considerations: the prominence of wishful thinking among people (that is
if you prejudge theism as wishful thinking) and the lack of consensus
about the nature of the transcendent. Could it be that the lack of
consensus about the nature of the transcendent is contributed in part by
an a priori commitment to the
paradigm of naturalism? Or course there is no consensus about the nature
of the transcendent when there is
a consensus among naturalists concerning the limits
of what transcendent can mean.
The Author's Approach
Stone's strategy is to
strengthen his argument by making it appear modest. He claims “no
unassailable foundations, empirical or otherwise” for his view, noting
that theism has none either. Therefore, Stone argues that religious
naturalism is “adequate and preferable” (to theism).
His positive argument states that religious naturalism does not
exceed proper ontological restraint (again the modest claim). Religious
naturalism helps nurture experiences of the transcendent without going too
far in making assertions about the transcendent (the assumption here is
that this avoidance is a morally good thing to do). The strength of his
position, he says, is that it “attempts to make minimal and cautious
affirmations, and tries to use cautious and tentative language claims”
It is however, “a challenge to the implicit reductionism of much of
current culture.”
In his response to critics, Stone says “the loss of
ultimates need not result in a fanaticism or despair.” There can be a
“resignation of ultimates combined with an openness to innerworldly
transcendence and commitment to penultimate values.” In other words, one
can live an optimistic and fulfilled life without God, religion, or
absolute values.
Finally, Stone makes use of a pragmatic argument.
While acknowledging that one must be cautious in using a pragmatic
test, he asks us to conduct a thought experiment where we consider the
pragmatic usefulness of religious naturalism verses theism. In his view,
theism has several pragmatic weakness: it often results in a false sense
of superiority or inferiority; it tends toward exclusivism; it can fall
into a crusading mentality because monotheism tends to support one value
as supreme; theologies of eschatological hope can lead to hopelessness or
cynicism. Even though he qualified it in the beginning, Stone has made the
pragmatic his main appeal. He has claimed for this “cautious” idea
grandiose prospects for world harmony. It is a typical but indirect
assault on theism as the culprit of human conflict--that it is not man,
but his beliefs in the “ontologically distinct category” of God that
have him led to war, pollution, corruption, etc. If we all adopt Stone's
thesis, the world would be at peace.
Evaluation
Strengths
Stone has done a good job in
his attempt to rescue secularism
from its apparent bankruptcy. He has done it with the honest admission
that he has no ultimate authority for values. He has challenged the idea,
put forward by many theists, that secularism lacks a sense of
transcendence and therefore is personally unrewarding. Stone has shown
that at least for him, on a subjective level (he is not depressed), there
is no necessary connection between naturalism, the “death of God,” and
despair. “God” lives on--as a symbol of transcendent values and
experiences.” He seems to say we have lost very little with the loss of
theism--only an intellectual category. We can still have the same quality
experiences and the same invigorating values as we did under theism. I
must credit him for making what I hear on a popular level sound
professional. Furthermore, Stone does it without appearing to criticize
religion.
By avoiding the truth-false
dichotomy, Stone was not directly putting anybody down--within naturalism.
No theist could miss the backhanded swat. But it is not theists who will
be impacted by this article. It is for this reason that I consider Stone's
piece a “good” article. Ironically, by suggesting an “openness” to
the transcendent, Stone may make the transition smoother for those who
would opt for animism, pantheism, or even process theology.
Weaknesses
Even if we give Stone his
premise of naturalism, his proposal fails even to achieve the modest
claims he set forth. I will focus this section on whether Stone has
achieved his stated aim: the adequacy and pragmatic superiority of
religious naturalism. As appealing as it might be as a coping mechanism to
those committed to naturalism, I do not think Stone's religious naturalism
can stand as an adequate or preferable view to theism. The essence of what
he said is since he is closed to theism, and humanistic naturalism has
been an inadequate worldview to build a culture on, “let's improve our
naturalism.” Stone simply seeks some fine-tuning within naturalism, but
the priority of the paradigm remains.
By defining religious the way he does, Stone is not saying
anything substantially more than any other naturalist (at least on an
objective level).
But if he wants it to mean
more then it is no longer naturalism--it could be animism and pantheism,
but not naturalism. Stone says religious naturalism realizes we are not
masters of our own fate. It seems that the difference
with common humanism on this point is simply an adjusted sense of
human capability. Unless we grant the existence of outside capability
(like gods or God) we are really not departing from humanism, only
changing its emotional caste from blindly optimistic to “optimistic
realism.” Since he spurns despair, and claims to be less confident than
typical humanism, it is unclear again how religious naturalism is any way
significantly different.
Stone is claiming an adequacy for religious naturalism that he does not
see in humanistic naturalism. Somewhere, he needs to show us an important
difference.
Stone claims that his view
helps “nurture experiences of the transcendent without going too far in
making assertions about the transcendent.”
There are several unanswered questions here. On what basis is Stone
making these value judgments? Why is this kind of nurturing good? Why is
the limit he is setting good? What if another naturalist insisted on
rejecting all these experiences? What compelling power does religious
naturalism have to nurture anything? Stone has drawn some line in his mind
as to what constitutes “going too far in making assertions about the
transcendent.” It seems with this criteria you nourish everything and
nothing. Any transcendent experience understood within
naturalism is nurtured and nothing beyond
the confines of naturalism is nurtured. I am not convinced that Stone is
setting up a nurturing and tolerant system. You will only be nurtured if
you play by his rules.
Furthermore this nurturing
Stone talks about seems to have no category for the problem of reinforcing
outright falsehoods? In Stone's system how would we critically evaluate a
feeling that might arise because we are mistaken about certain essential
facts. If there is a devil (and I believe there is) and if he in fact
impersonates good and twists truth (and I am convinced he does), then the
practitioner of religious naturalism would never know it. In fact,
religious naturalism would make it impossible to ever even test the idea
of spiritual deception because at its very core, religious naturalism
judges no transcendent experience as invalid. My statements here do not
prove the existence of an evil spiritual realm, but Stone's thesis assures
that if it does exist it will never be detected by followers of religious
naturalism.
To Stone I ask, why is it OK to
nurture relative transcendence,
but not more than that? Unless one is more likely to be true than the other, I don't see how that value judgment could be
made. He has not shown that it is more rational to affirm or seek
experiences of relative transcendence over contact with a distinct
transcendent realm. Just because some people who have claimed contact with
an ontologically distinct being have been intolerant does mean that such a
being does not exist.
Another question I have for
Stone is, why does he think we can retain all those
values of tolerance, openness, etc. without any ultimate truth
authority. Well, perhaps Stone has a reason, but it is totally unrealistic
in view of human history to think that his ideas will have any strength on
the social level. Only those who share the same values as Stone will
cooperate. His theory fails to take into account human nature--what do we
do with those who simply reject the values of openness and tolerance, such
as skin-heads and the new Russian anti-semite? I'm sure these people would
claim a relative sense of transcendence to their racial ideology. Stone's
religious naturalism is at least as weak as humanistic naturalism in its
inability to provide a rationale for anything beyond a private experience
like the feeling of winning a football game. If religious naturalism is
“adequate,” as Stone says it is, so is a six-pack and a football game.
As Paul said, “If the dead are not raised (and they are not in religious
naturalism) then let us eat and drink for tomorrow we die.” (I
Corinthians 15:32). If
religious naturalism is only “preferable,” then religious naturalism
is a big “so what?” to everyone but those who prefer it. The real
issue about a worldview is whether it is true.
What the world needs is not another affirmation of personal experience,
but a set of propositions that can be investigated intellectually,
appropriated spiritually, and put to use socially to help people with real
needs. Christian theism has not only positive and objective evidence, but
a more compelling reason to be tolerant and compassionate: the example of
the incarnate Christ, who presented evidence that He was from a distinct
transcendent realm, who spoke truth and loved people blinded by false
ideas of reality. He could not have loved them without exposing the lies
that controlled their lives. For Jesus Christ, bold (as opposed to
“modest”) claims and
truly transcendent (as opposed to relatively)
experiences go together: “And you shall know the truth and the
truth shall set you free” (Jn. 8:32).
Jerome Stone is doing nothing
more than suggesting a coping mechanism for the dark implications of
naturalism and pure secularism. If he is trying to set up something that
makes such a small claim that it can not be criticized, then why bother? It seems Stone wants to have his cake and eat it too. He
wants to preserve his human autonomy while enjoying the
transcendent identity and experience that only comes from knowing a
real Creator God. The sad thing is that Stone really isn't going help
people “cope” at all. His “modest” claim may keep people estranged
from the love of Jesus Christ forever.
Back to Worldviews class
Back
to Apologetics